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1  Introduction 
 
With the end of the war in 1945 both the British and Japanese cotton industries, which had dominated the 
prewar market in cotton textiles, lost no time in beginning the task of rehabilitation. Most of the spinning 
and weaving factories had been converted to military production, but as governmental control was gradually 
relaxed, textile production started up again and the workers returned to the factories. Demand for textiles, 
which had been suppressed during the War, re-emerged almost instantaneously, making both the domestic 
and foreign markets very buoyant. In addition, securing the supply of raw cotton was relatively easy as the 
United States and other countries held vast surplus stocks.  Under such conditions the cotton industries of 
both countries bought new machinery and equipment and embarked on a drastic reorganisation. 
 
The outcome of this reorganisation in the two countries turned out to be very different, as had become 
apparent by 1960. In Britain it was recognized that the industry had lost its competitive edge, and the Cotton 
Industry Act of 1959, which encouraged a great reduction in the number of spindles, represented a decision 
to reduce the size of the industry considerably.2 In Japan, meanwhile, the cotton industry recovered its 
international competitiveness very rapidly after the war; by 1951 it had become once again the world's 
largest exporter of cotton textiles, and continued to dominate the world market throughout the 1950s. 
Thereafter its share fell as other Asian countries caught up, and it yielded its first place in volume of exports 
to China in 1967. Also, with the rise of heavy and chemical industry in Japan the cotton industry gradually 
lost its position as an industry at the cutting edge of technological innovation. However, there is no doubt 
that its development as the principal export industry from 1946 to 1960 was an important factor in the 
revival and rapid growth of Japan's economy. 
 
What then were the international conditions which made possible this recovery of the cotton industry of a 
defeated Japan? In previous research the following three main factors have been noted. First, from an 
international relations viewpoint, it was the result, directly and indirectly, of America's consolidation of her 
hegemony in the world order against the background of the emergence of the Cold War. Despite opposition 
from Britain, mainly stemming from consideration of Lancashire's interests, America aided the revival of 
Japan's cotton piece goods exports to South and Southeast Asia by giving priority to a policy of containing 
China and therefore not permitting trade between Japan and China, and in compensation linking Japan's 
exports to America's aid to Asia, and promoting Japan's membership of the GATT.3 The influence of the 
Cold War is visible here in various ways. The cotton industry, with the favourable disposition of the 
Occupation and the American government which were trying to revive Japan's economy without militarizing 
it, enjoyed a generally advantageous international environment. 
 
                                 
1 This is an English translation, with slight modification, of "Sengo Nihon Mengyo o meguru Kokusai 
Kankyo", published in Kindai Nihon Kenkyu, Yamakawa Shuppansha, Tokyo, 1997.  
2 R. Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, Macmillan, London, 1957. John Singleton, Lancashire on the 
Scrapheap: The Cotton Industry 1945-1970, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991. But Singleton also 
argues that insufficient investment in new equipment during the postwar boom contributed to 
Lancashire's decline. 
3 Takafusa Nakamura, "Nichibei Keizai Kyoryoku Kankei no Keisei (The Formation of U.S.-Japan 
Economic Cooperation)", Nenpo Kindai Nihon Kenkyu 4: Taiheiyo Senso , Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1982, 
pp.279-302. William Borden, The Pacific Alliance: The United States and Japanese Trade Recovery, 
1947-1955, University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, 1984. Michael Schaller, The American 
Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985. 
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A second factor, related to the first, and well known to students of the history of the cotton industry and of 
trade,4 is that economically, America, with her need to export her raw cotton, and Japan with her cotton 
industry, presented the prospect of a perfect partnership. Initially, America's aim was to dispose of huge 
surplus stocks of raw cotton, but gradually it became evident that the cotton industries of America and 
Western Europe were no longer competitive, and the cotton growers of America wanted an increase in the 
number of spindles in the Japanese cotton spinning industry. America continued to offer credit to Japan for 
the purchase of its raw cotton.  Thus, if we take Japan as an industrial country which was relatively 
competitive in labour-intensive industries, and America not just as an industrial country which specialized in 
capital-intensive industries but also a country at the same time supplying primary products to Asia, we have 
here the basis for developing an international division of labour. A similar phenomenon was seen to some 
degree in the prewar period, but with the development of a network of marine transport and communications 
in the Pacific after the war, this became a powerful driving force behind the development of an Asia-Pacific 
international division of labour and one which included also Japan's relationship with Australia and other 
resource-rich countries. 
 
Third, however, there were circumstances which forbade a repetition of the prewar success story. One was 
the independence and the emerging import -substitution industrialization of the Asian countries, which 
severely restricted the scale of Asia's foreign cotton piece goods market.5  This was a situation which did 
not exist before the war when most countries in Asia were either in a colonial or a quasi-colonial state. Also, 
the market in the advanced countries of the West expanded after the war, but here strong moves began to be 
made to limit the inflow of cheap Asian cotton piece goods by voluntary restrictions on the part of the 
exporting countries and quotas set by importing countries.6 1946-1960 was a period of rapid recovery in the 
world's industrial production and trade. In the cotton industry too the volume of world's production and 
consumption increased, but the factors above to a large extent balanced each other out, allowing trade to 
experience no more than a gentle recovery.7  
 
Why was it that despite this the Japanese cotton industry, and it alone, was able to open up one after another 
of the world's markets? This paper aims to deepen understanding of this point, by focusing on the fourth 
factor that the Japanese cotton industry confronted, that is, the competition in the world market with other 
Asian countries such as India, China and Hong Kong. In the 1946-60 period most of the countries of Asia 
and Africa, which were primary product producing countries before the war, were in the initial stages of 
import-substitution, and frequently lacked the capacity to satisfy their own domestic demand for cotton piece 
goods. Also there were some primary product producing countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, 
where incomes were high, but which had no domestic cotton piece goods supply capacity. As rehabilitation 
progressed after the war, exports of primary products to the advanced countries recovered, and when the 
purchasing power of the supplying countries increased, Britain, the former leading supplier, was unable to 
satisfy adequately even the demand within the Commonwealth. The opportunity thus created was seized by 
three Asian countries - Japan, China, and India - and by Hong Kong, whose strength had grown out of the 
manpower and know-how accumulated in China's cotton industry. Their efforts in these markets resulted in 
very vigorous inter-Asian competition.  
                                 
4 Yasuo Tawa ed., Sengo Bosekishi (A History of the [Japanese] Cotton Spinning Industry in the Postwar 
Period), Nihon Boseki Kyokai, Osaka, 1962. Ajia no Sen-i Sangyo (Textile Industries in Asia), Ajia 
Keizai Kenkyusho, Tokyo, 1962. Hiroshi Nishikawa, "Boeki no Jittai to Tsusho Seisaku (Foreign Trade 
and Trade Policy)", in Tsusho Sangyo Seisakushi, 4-1-3, Tsusho Sangyosho, Tokyo, 1990. Takeshi Abe, 
"Keikogyo no Saiken (The Rehabilitation of Light Industries)", in Tsusho Sangyo Seisakushi, 3-1-2, 
Tsusho Sangyosho, Tokyo, 1992. Shinkichi Nagaoka and Hiroshi Nishikawa eds, Nihon Keizai to 
Higashi Ajia—Senji to Sengo no Keizaishi— (The Japanese Economy and East Asia: An Economic 
History of the Wartime and Postwar Periods), Mineruva Shobo, Kyoto, 1995. 
5  Sengo Bosekishi, pp.835-42. 
6  Vinod K. Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985, Chapter 3. 
7  The proportion of cotton cloth entered into foreign trade in world production was relatively small. 
According to GATT, the share of exports in total world cotton cloth production in 1910-13 was 29 per 
cent, but declined to 10 per cent in 1936-38. It recovered to 15 per cent in 1950, but declined again to 12 
per cent in 1960. GATT, A Study on Cotton Textiles, Geneva, 1966, p.10. See also OEEC, The Future of 
the European Cotton Industry,  Paris, 1957, pp.16-17, for slightly different figures. 
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What were the factors which determined the end result of inter-Asian competition? How did this competition 
influence the pattern of industrialization of Japan, India and China? And what connection did it have with 
the dissolution of the British Commonwealth market and the trend towards formation of a free trade system 
with America as its leader? This paper integrates the materials collected by the British Cotton Board8, with 
descriptive, analytical accounts in relevant periodicals from each country, to investigate these questions, and 
dis cusses the causes of the recovery and growth of Japan's cotton industry. It should be made clear that the 
scope of this paper is limited to information about trade volumes, market shares and prices, and investigating 
the perception of the people involved or those in close contact with them. Also, it deals mainly with the 
cotton piece goods market, touching occasionally on the related markets for raw cotton, cotton yarn, rayon, 
cotton processed goods etc as they relate to the cotton piece goods market. 
 
2   Patterns of Inter-Asian Competition 
 
It is in fact not so easy to grasp the scale and trends of the world market in cotton piece goods. Table 1 was 
compiled by the Japan Cotton Spinners' Association based on statistics gathered by the Cotton Board. As can 
be seen, the statistics of each country are shown in three completely different kinds of units - square yards, 
yards and quintals (a unit of weight), and to simply add them up as in this table is clearly wrong. However 
the Cotton Board's statistics, on which these are based, although not added to produce totals, do suggest such 
a manner of reading, and since this kind of rough and ready conversion was carried out both in Britain and 
elsewhere, such calculations must have served a certain function in the perception of the world market at the 
time. Also, it is thought that if one converts yards and quintals to square yards using available conversion 
rates, the results of the calculations in the table turn out by good fortune to involve a maximum error of only 
about 10 per cent.9 Therefore, taking the tables below as usable for the purpose of pursuing broad trends, let 
us take a brief look at the structure of exports in the world cotton piece goods market country by country. 
 
First, the absolute volume of the world market in exported cotton piece goods in 1946 was no more than a 
third of what it had been in 1937, but it had recovered more or less to the prewar level by 1960. Asia's share, 
which in 1937 had been 41 per cent, had fallen to 14 per cent in 1946, but thereafter recovered rapidly and 
by 1960 had risen to 46 per cent. By contrast, the British share, which in 1937 had accounted for 27 per cent, 
                                 
8  The Cotton Board had its headquarters in Manchester, and represented the interests of not only raw 
cotton dealers but the whole British cotton industry, and was active in the collection of information and 
political lobbying. For details, see Marguerite W. Dupree, "Struggling with Destiny: The Cotton Industry, 
Overseas Trade Policy and the Cotton Board, 1940-1959", Business History, 32-4, October 1990, 
pp.106-27, and M.W.Dupree ed., Lancashire and Whitehall: The Diary of Sir Raymond Streat, 
1931-1957, 2 volumes, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1987. 
9 The statistics published by the Cotton Board did present figures in three different measurements in one 
table, though in such tables these figures were not summed. The Cotton Board Trade Letter  began to 
include a note, starting in the ninth issue of its "Statistical Supplement" section, November 1947, "1 
quintal = 220.5 lb. On the basis of 4.5 sq. yds. per lb., 1,000 Quintals are equivalent to approx. 1 million 
sq. yds.". (The "Statistical Supplement" became the "Quarterly Statistical Review", and after June 1952 
became a separate publication titled Cotton Board Quarterly Statistical Review.) From the 65th issue 
(published in June 1952), however, an additional sentence "But in practice the average weight of many 
cloths is heavier than this amount" was added. Further, from the 67th issue (published in winter 1962-63), 
"The Cotton Board cannot guarantee the accuracy or completeness of all the figures". There is no direct 
reference to the conversion rate from yard to square yard in this publication. However, other official 
statistics did assume "1 yard = 1 square yard", and converted the former into square yards. See Colonial 
Office, Digest of Colonial Statistics.  
 Looking more broadly at the historiography, there is a reference to an estimate of "1 yard = 1.10272 
square yard", based on the information from the Chinese trade statistics. see Albert Feuerwerker, 
"Handicraft and Manufactured Cotton Textiles in China, 1871-1910", Journal of Economic History,  
30-2, June 1970, p.360. As for the weight to yard conversion, "1 pound = 5.5 yards" is mentioned in 
Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain , p.333. This is based on the British statistics. Using these rates, 
the rate of 1 quintal = 1099.59 square yards could be obtained, which implies that in the Cotton Board 
tables the amount of trade expressed in yards or quintals is underestimated by about 10 per cent.  
 I am grateful to Professors Douglas Farnie and Takeshi Abe for informing me of some of the above 
references. 
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fell from 21 per cent in 1946 to 5 per cent in 1960. Changes in the shares of the other main countries/areas at 
these three dates (1937, 1946 and 1960) were as follows: Western Continental Europe -  23 per cent -> 19 
per cent -> 28 per cent, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union -  4 per cent -> 0 per cent -> 10 per cent, 
America -  3 per cent -> 33 per cent -> 6 per cent. From the above it can be seen that the shares of Japan 
and other industrialising Asian countries and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union increased their share 
greatly while conversely the international competitiveness of America and Britain, which accounted for an 
extremely large share immediately after the war, was reduced.  
 
Looking at Asia's share in slightly more detail, it is important to see that Japan, which was the largest 
exporter in the world with 37 per cent in 1937, recovered from 0 per cent in 1946 to 20 per cent by 1960, and 
was once again the world's largest exporting country from 1951. However, equally worthy of notice is the 
rapid rise in the total share of other Asian countries -  4 per cent-> 13 per cent -> 26 per cent. India was 
initially by far the most important of these, and China (from 1949 on, the People's Republic of China, but 
hereafter simply referred as China), despite a longish gap in the period immediately after the Communist 
takeover, gradually grew in importance. In the second half of the 1950s Hong Kong, Taiwan, Pakis tan, and 
South Korea were added to the list of exporting countries. If one considers the bewildering changes in 
international relations at the time, conditions were such that Japan would have seemed at the time not to 
have had the race all to herself. 
 
Turning to the structure of the importing countries in Table 2, an interesting reversal of the historical trend 
can be seen in the world market at this period: the centre of gravity of the world market in foreign-made 
cotton piece goods was showing a tendency to shift from Asia back to the West. Reflecting the progress of 
import-substitution in many Asian and African countries, imports of cotton piece goods began to stagnate or 
fall. Among those where there was a conspicuous decline were Indonesia, Malaya (the Federated Malay 
States, from 1948 the Malayan Federation - including Singapore throughout), the Philippines, and countries 
of former French Indochina (North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). There were nevertheless a 
few countries such as Nigeria where the tendency was rather for imports to increase. Meanwhile in the 
advanced countries, imports increased in Britain, Australia, America, West Germany etc, reflecting the 
increased competitiveness of Asian cotton industry countries. In the 1950s America and Britain's imports 
from Japan, India, Pakistan and Hong Kong started to become a political issue and were repeatedly restricted 
by agreements. France, West Germany and other countries in continental Europe used quotas to severely 
limit imports from Asia.10 Had the advanced countries of the West not resorted to restrictions on imports, 
there is little doubt that Asian exports to the West would  have increased more.  
 
Thus in the world market of this period there appeared a situation which could be called a new type of 
inter-Asian competition. The cotton industry of the internationally competitive Asian countries such as Japan, 
India, China and Hong Kong, caught between the hammer of the trend to import-substitution of the 
developing countries and the anvil of protectionism in the advanced nations, transcended the traditional 
regional boundaries between Asia and the West to engage in intense competition for share on a global scale. 
 
Let us now outline the export patterns of the four main Asian exporting countries. Taking Japan first, Asia 
and Africa accounted for 70-84 per cent of her exports at this period until 1954, after which the proportion 
fell somewhat, but even so it fluctuated between 59 per cent and 68 per cent until 1960. Also, it should be 
noted that cotton piece goods exported to Britain were almost all "re-exported" (the contemporary 
expression - as they were  processed in Britain before being exported again, they were not re -exports in the 
usual sense of the word) to West Africa and other British possessions, of which more later. According to 
Table 3, first looking at the trend of Asia and Africa, the principal markets, it can be seen that exports to 
every country rose rapidly until 1951, after which, because there was repeated production control under 
administrative guidance (kankoku sotan) in the 1950s, they achieved no more than a rather gentle expansion 
overall, despite the two peaks in 1954 and 1957. The distinctive feature about this period is that Japan was 
unable to ensure stable export volumes in  almost all the countries, repeating a pattern in which a very brief 
boom was followed by a falling trend and then was compensated by expansion into new markets. That said, 
if one includes re-exports via Hong Kong, Indonesia was comparatively steady, and the largest market 
almost throughout.  Next came South and Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Malaya, Burma, the 
Philippines, former French Indochina, Pakistan and Ceylon, and from the second half of the 1950s African 
markets such as the countries in former British West Africa increased in importance. Exports to Britain on 
                                 
10 GATT, A Study on Cotton Textiles, p.82. Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism, pp.73-74. 
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the other hand were reduced by restriction agreements, and in America too, after a temporary sharp rise in 
share, Japan agreed in 1955 to voluntary exports restrictions, and reduced her export volumes thereafter. As 
a result, although Japan did increase her exports to Western markets, its growth was not as fast as the rate of 
increase of the share of Western markets in world trade. Rather it became the rule that in the Asian and 
African markets there was an opening-up of individual markets wherever and whenever the political 
conditions permitted, with a powerful sales offensive on the basis of international competitiveness. The 
majority of exports in the initial period after the war were unbleached cotton cloth, even though the share of 
processed goods rose in the 1950s, and there was progress in product diversification and a shift to higher 
quality products.  There was no clear move towards a differentiation to the goods in demand in the market 
of low-wage countries. This explains why Japanese goods were exposed to intense inter-Asian 
competition.11 
  
While the low level of wages compared with the advanced countries can be pointed out as factors 
underpinning Japan's competitiveness, compared with the Asian countries, which were her chief competitors, 
it was important that Japan had new advanced machinery and equipment and good-quality labour. In the 
initial period, however, in order to ensure effective allocation of raw cotton given the shortage of dollars, 
and again in the 1950s in order to avoid violent inventory and price fluctuations and the resulting "dumping 
exports", the industry and the government united to regulate production, so that the rate of capacity 
utilization of machinery was low. It is noted that the foreign currency allocation system for the purchase of 
raw cotton worked as an effective policy tool.   The system was put in place in 1950 when private imports 
restarted, although it was not fully applied until 1953. Since the industrialists feared that their raw cotton 
allocation would be cut if they did not respond when the government suggested short-time working, there 
was considerable power in the government's "guidance". Also, not only was the allocation of raw cotton 
proportioned to the machinery, but also, with the aim of encouraging exports, the system was partially linked 
to export performance. At the same time, in order to avoid cut-throat competition and dumping, a system of 
export license was put in place and an export inspection system to check the quality of products was also 
gradually introduced.12 This is a framework under which the "compartmentarised competition" took place, 
giving direct impetus to technological innovation. A conspicuous improvement in productivity resulting 
from efforts to streamline, automate, make continuous and speed up the production process and to eliminate 
defects,13 was mainly due to the self-generating competition of the industry, but the role of the government, 
which encouraged export competitiveness in both prices and product quality, cannot be ignored. Thus the 
prewar context of inter-Asian competition by adapting to the demands of Asian and African markets was 
maintained, and Japan continuously refined her ability to manufacture the product characterised by a greater 
variety, a relatively high level of processing, and good  quality.   
 
Furthermore, in the second half of the 1950s, Japan's rayon piece goods succeeded in replacing cotton piece 
goods in a number of markets (in the Cotton Board's statistics for rayon piece goods, these and a very small 
quantity of synthetic fibre piece goods are lumped together as man-made fibre piece goods), and achieved a 
more rapid export expansion than any other country through the low price.  In 1957 and 1958 the volume of 
rayon piece goods exported temporarily surpassed that of cotton piece goods. 
 
Next let us look at the export destinations of Indian cotton piece goods in Table 4. Before the war India 
imported large quantities from Britain, Japan etc, but from 1941 exports exceeded imports, and after the wa r 
exports expanded very rapidly. In 1950 India became the world's largest exporting country. The export 
destinations at this point were the Commonwealth market, such as Singapore (Malaya was separately 
recorded), Burma, Aden, Ceylon, British East Africa, Sudan and Pakistan. However, the increase in exports 
in that year, achieved despite a fall in production, was a temporary effect produced by the government's 
imposition of domestic price ceilings, and thereafter the government gave priority to domestic consumption 
and limited the export volume through the control of the issue of export licences.14  
                                 
11 Sengo Boekishi, pp.307-15. 
12 Ibid., pp.226-58. Shin Hasegawa, "Gaika Wariate Seido no Unyo to sono Sagyo Seisakuteki Igi (The 
Working of the Foreign Exchange Allocation System and its Significance as a Tool of Industrial 
Policy)", in Tsusho Sangyo Seisakushi, 6-2-2, Tsusho Sangyosho, Tokyo, 1990, pp.153-85. 
13 Sengo Boekishi, pp.109-118. 
14Cotton Board Trade Letter, Quarterly Statistical Review (hereafter QSR), No.20, December 1950, p.1. 
Ibid., No.21, March 1951, p.2. 
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Post-independence India's cotton industry was successful overall in supplying mass clothing to the enormous 
domestic market, using cheap raw cotton produced within the country. However, despite trying an export 
promotion policy to obtain foreign exchange, India was not a strong competitor in product quality, and there 
were also problems with foreign marketing and packaging.15 On the other hand, Indian textiles, taking 
advantage of the framework of the Ottawa Agreement (so-called "preferential tariffs") originally set with a 
view to the interests of Lancashire, and the various Commonwealth countries' import restrictions on 
Japanese goods, were able to be exported more freely than Japanese or Chinese and at low tariff rates.16 
Ironically, preferential tariffs acted as an institutional arrangement to promote India's exports of 
manufactured goods rather than those of the former mother country. While Japanese cotton goods' access to 
the British market was restricted, Indian ones had the privilege of totally tariff-free status, and despite quotas 
by agreement in 1958-59, India continued to be the biggest exporter throughout the 1950s. Thus inter-Asian 
competition was played out, not in a single world market, but in two interconnected markets, the British 
Commonwealth and the rest of the world. Then in the 1950s the barrier between the two markets was 
gradually reduced by a de facto lowering of tariff rates and a relaxation of the import restrictions on 
Japanese goods. In the second half of the 1950s the well-established Indian trading network had to face 
competition from Japan and China. 
 
Let us now turn to the third country, China. The Cotton Board's statistics carry China's cotton piece goods 
export volumes up to 1948 (but these volumes are far below the statistics of the importing countries), but 
from the time of Communist takeover they vanish. Table 5 gives figures obtained by extracting the figures 
for China from each country's import statistics. Since Hong Kong's share is large, this method cannot give us 
a full picture of the export destinations, but there is no doubt that mo st went to the Asian and African 
markets.17  In the second half of the 1950s Japan's greatest rival in these markets were China and Hong 
Kong, especially, if measured purely in quantitative terms, China. Indonesia was the main battleground, but 
Chinese goods also went to Malaya and other Southeast Asian countries, to Holland and Britain (though in 
the case of Britain they were mostly re-exported after processing) and to Nigeria and Australia. 
 
Until very shortly after the Communist takeover, China imported American cotton, and processed it into 
cotton piece goods, which were then exported to Hong Kong, Malaya, etc. The state-run corporations, which 
inherited Japanese-owned mills in relatively good condition, even planned to replace Japan in the Southeast 
Asian market in order to avoid competition with private capital in the domestic market. Certainly the exports 
in Table 5 for 1947-48 are not negligible.18 After the takeover of 1949, with the danger of a blockade of 
Shanghai and the dire shortage of foreign exchange, plans were made for self-sufficiency in raw cotton, and 
also from 1951 large spinning factories were set up one after another, mainly in the interior. However, the 
cost of domestic raw cotton production was comparatively high, and the old existing machines were utilized 
to the maximum, so the production cost of cotton piece goods remained higher than the international level. 
Thus competitiveness in the Southeast Asian market was not achieved. The sharp increase in the second half 
of the 1950s was achieved by setting prices artificially 10 per cent below international prices. In 1960 the 
domestic price of cotton goods was about double the export price, which implied that the profit from 
domestic sales were making up the losses on exports.19   
 
Finally, let us touch on the development of Hong Kong's modern cotton industry (see Table 6). Hong Kong's 
modern cotton industry (spinning mills and intergrated spinning and weaving mills) started out based on 
entrepreneurs who moved from Shanghai from 1946, and went through explosive growth from 1947 to 1951, 
                                 
15 For example, see B.N.Ganguli, India's Economic Relations with the Far Eastern and Pacific Countries in 
the Present Century,  Orient Longmans, Bombay, 1956, p.84. 
16 In 1948 members of the British Commonwealth enjoyed tariff rates about 12 per cent lower than other 
countries on the import items specified (which accounted for about a half of total imports). Donald 
MacDougall and Rosemary Hutt, "Imperial Preference: A Quantitative Analysis", Economic Journal, 64, 
1954, p.257. 
17Hong Kong Textile Annual  (hereafter HTA), 1956, pp.5-6. Ibid., 1959-1960, pp.9, 12. 
18 Mitsuru Hagiwara, "Sengo Chugoku no Boeki: Menkogyo (Foreign Trade of Postwar China: The Cotton 
Industry)", in Nagaoka and Nishikawa eds, Nihon Keizai to Higashi Ajia, pp.415-17. HTA, 1961, 
pp.17-19. 
19 Hagiwara, "Sengo Chugoku no Boeki", pp.410-24. 
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but with the outbreak of the Korean War the American government prohibited the export of American cotton 
to Hong Kong, fearing the possibility of exports of Hong Kong cotton piece goods to China. Dealt this 
severe blow, the Hong Kong cotton industry barely maintained its production level by importing raw cotton 
from Pakistan, Brazil and British East Africa and advancing into the market in Indonesia by allowing her to 
settle in sterling, where Japanese goods were shunned because of a shortage of dollars. In the second half of 
the 1950s Hong Kong became able to use American cotton again as its main raw material, and by 
introducing state-of-the-art machinery on a par with that used in Japan, and operating at a far higher rate of 
capacity utilization, managed to maintain its competitiveness. In addition, through joint ventures with 
Japanese companies such as Toyobo, spinning factories entering the fine count market also appeared.20 
 
In Hong Kong there was no regulation of production by cooperation of the industry and government as in 
Japan, and business went through violent ups and downs. From a quality point of view, Hong Kong was 
competing in almost the same markets as Japan and China, but since it was able to enjoy preferential 
treatment in the Commonwealth, it advanced into that market, where there was no competition from Japan 
and China, and, in spite of the competition with India and Pakistan, in 1958-59 it increased its share so fas t 
that the British government had to demand "voluntary" restrictions. From the second half of the 1950s it also 
advanced into the American market where a gap had appeared due to the voluntary restrictions of Japan. 
 
Let us summarize. The three main cotton producers of the prewar period, Japan, China and India, despite the 
political changes of the independence of the Asian countries and the establishment of the Cold War world 
order, re -emerged as the principal exporting countries in the postwar world market. However, in China's case 
the prewar accumulation of manufacturing experience manifested in two separate regions, China proper and 
Hong Kong. While India and Hong Kong, under the protection of preferential status, expanded their share in 
the Commonwealth, which accounted for more than half the world market, Japan and China were relatively 
late in their advance into there, and their share was larger in the South and Southeast Asian market, 
especially Indonesia. However even in the British Commonwealth market the inter-Asian competition 
gradually became more intense, and the structure of a new world market took shape. In the next section we 
will pursue the process of these changes in more detail. 
 
 
3  The Disintegration of the Commonwealth Market 
 
Inter-Asian competition was not just a matter of filling gaps in the postwar world market: it emerged amid 
the reorganization of the prewar world market through the retreat of Britain and the advance of Asian 
countries. In this sense, the protagonists in this section are Britain and Japan. Both countries were similar in 
some respects. They imported raw cotton, and exported a very large proportion of their cotton piece goods to 
the world market. Also, compared with countries like America, India or China which, while they had 
enormous domestic production for home consumption, were engaged marginally in the world market, or 
with the countries of continental Europe, where intra-regional trade totals were large but direct involvement 
in the world market was relatively small, both Britain and Japan had a disproportionately strong degree of 
influence on the world market. Let us now consider the process of structural change, dividing it into three 
stages: (1) the period up to 1950, in which both countries' exports expanded very fast; (2) the period to 1955 
in which Britain's exports fell and Japan's exports to the Commonwealth began to increase; and (3) the 
period to 1960, which saw a sharp expansion in imports by Britain as the Commonwealth market slowly 
disintegrated. 
 
The first period 
As can be seen from Table 7, Britain's exports of cotton piece goods rose very rapidly until 1949 reflecting 
postwar demand. As can be inferred from Table 2 the share of the British Commonwealth in the world  
market at this period was extremely large. However in Britain the production of cotton cloth could not keep 
up with the production capacity of processing companies, so Japanese cotton piece goods were imported, 
processed in Britain, and then exported to West Africa and other areas. In 1949 such cloth made up about 20 
per cent of Britain's exports of cotton piece goods. There was a fear that the colonies might import cotton 
                                 
20 HTA, 1956, p.3. Ibid., 1961, pp.24-34. Independent weavers formed separate associations, including one 
for those who came from Shanghai and another for Cantonese. However, there were many who did not 
belong to any association. As a result, the organisational capability of independent weavers was generally 
weaker. Ibid., pp.44-45.  
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piece goods from the dollar area if "British goods" were not supplied by this means. It was expected that if 
the price of its primary products rose, the purchasing power of a colony would rise, and its cotton piece 
goods market would expand more than that of markets for other goods. Alec Cairncross, Economic Adviser 
to the Board of Trade, had already pointed out in 1950 that the benefit to Britain of the preferential tariff 
system would become questionable if Lancashire had insufficient capacity to take full advantage of such 
tariffs.21 
 
Nevertheless, a shortage of dollars made it difficult for Commonwealth countries to import cotton piece 
goods from America, and this shortage was aggravated when Britain withdrew from the convertibility 
provision between dollar and sterling in 1947. Japan began exporting to the sterling area in April 1948, and 
in the same year concluded payment and trade agreements with the area, as well as reaching separate trade 
agreements with Burma and Pakistan in 1949, and set about making good use of them. The idea was that if 
the trade with the whole sterling area was in balance, there would be no objection to receiving payment in 
sterling.22  Japan was rapidly successful in shipping great quantities of exports to Britain in 1949 and 
Pakistan in 1950-51. 
 
However, the country which captured most of the postwar demand in the Commonwealth was not Japan but 
India. In Australia for example, Britain had an overwhelming share of the market, but in 1949-51 India took 
advantage of the devaluation of the pound to gain entry to what before the war had been a Japanese 
market.23 In Malaya, which in 1950 was second only to Indonesia in volume of cotton piece goods 
imported, India held most of this market despite competition from Japan and China. Part of this was 
re-exported to Indonesia from Singapore.24 The increase in imports to Malaya was the result of an increase 
in purchasing power due to the recovery in price and export volume of tin and rubber, but the 30 per cent 
devaluation of sterling of 1949 was also an important factor, as it improved India's price competitiveness. 
Traditionally, Malaya tended to export her primary produce to the dollar area and import consumer goods 
from the sterling area, so that she acted as a focal point of Asia's mulitilateral trade settlement mechanism. It 
is thought that the re-emergence of this pattern at this period helped to alleviate the dollar shortage of the 
British Commonwealth.25 
 
Finally, let us briefly touch on the world's largest importer of cotton piece goods, Indonesia. From before the 
war Indonesia had a large population, and a purchasing power deriving from exports of primary products, 
but was nevertheless relatively slow to develop a modern cotton industry, with the result that it was one of 
the world's largest markets for foreign-made cotton piece goods. During the Japanese occupation and the 
postwar period of civil war, there was stagnation not only because poor internal communications and other 
factors created an unfavourable market environment, but also because the import of raw cotton and yarn was 
severely restricted. Latent domestic demand had therefore been building up. In 1948 quotas were imposed on 
the quantity of processed cotton cloth and cotton garments, as a result of which the volume of cotton imports 
did not reach prewar levels. On the other hand, imports of cotton yarn and unbleached cotton cloth increased 
to surpass their prewar levels.26 Even so, the total quantity of cotton piece goods imported was very large, 
as can be seen from Table 8. Japan concluded a trade agreement with Indonesia in late 1948, and set about 
exporting with settlement in dollars. In 1949 funds for the Marshall Plan for reconstruction in Europe were 
                                 
21 "Imported Cloth", Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers' Association, Minute Books, 11th January 1952. 
A.K.Cairncross, "International Trade, Trends and Prospects", Cotton Board Trade Letter, No.64, 
November 1949, pp.5-6. QSR, No.18, April 1950, p.1.  
22  QSR, No.14, March 1949, p.1. Gaimusho Tsusansho Kanri Boeki Kenkyukai, Sengo Nihon no 
Boeki·Kinyu Kyotei (Trade and Financial Agreements of Postwar Japan), Jitsugyo no Nihonsha, Tokyo, 
1949, pp.15-42. Pakistan Trade, 1-1, April 1950, pp.20-21. 
23 Cotton Board Trade Letter, No.59, April 1949, p.7. QSR, No.23, September 1951, p.2. 
24 QSR, No.22, June 1951, p.2. Ibid., No.23, September 1951, p.2. 
25 Ganguli, India's Economic Relations, pp.80-85. 
26  Ingrid Palmer, Textiles in Indonesia: Problems of Import Substitution, Praeger, New York, 1972, 
pp.48-56. 
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used to import Japanese-made goods.27 It was perhaps not surprising that exports of Japanese goods were 
concentrated in the only large market not belonging to the British Commonwealth. 
 
The second period 
From 1949 onwards the Britis h cotton industry met competition first from India and then from Japan and 
China, and was forced to retreat in almost every market. Britain's share declined in India and Pakistan, which 
had been her principal prewar markets, and in 1949 was faced with Japanese and Chinese competition in 
British East Africa and Malaya.28 In British East Africa competition with India was fierce, and the latter 
country was able to seize the lead helped by the restrictions on Japanese goods.29 Britain's three largest 
markets at this time were West Africa, South Africa and Australia, but in West Africa, whose purchasing 
power depended on exports of primary products, she came up against Indian and Japanese competition, 
suffering serious losses despite import restrictions on Japanese goods, while British exports to the other two 
markets stagnated, affected by import substitution in South Africa, and in Australia by a shortage of foreign 
exchange.30 
 
The proportion of Japan's exports accounted for by the Commonwealth was high from the first, but it is 
important to note that this proportion had been maintained in the overall expansion of exports.31 The 
devaluation of the pound in 1949 reduced Japan's competitiveness in the Commonwealth market in price 
terms, but since most of the preferential tariffs were specific duties, rather than ad valorem, there was a 
tendency for their real effect to be weakened by inflation. Also, in vie w of the pressure from GATT, Britain 
could not raise tariffs or widen the scope of preferential tariffs.32 Japan voluntarily restricted exports to the 
sterling area in 1952 in response to import restrictions, which led to a relaxation of the restrictions across the 
area the following year.33 
 
At the same time, a certain market segmentation was becoming discernible. Great quantities of Indian cotton 
piece goods were exported to Britain between 1951 and 1954. The Cotton Board pointed out that India's raw 
cotton export restrictions and low wages enabled her to supply raw cotton at a price far below world prices, 
and that because of Japanese competition a great concentration of Indian goods were being exported to 
Britain and the Commonwealth. The CIF price of Indian unbleached cotton cloth imported into Britain was 
42s 6d per pound, which was not only cheaper than British cotton cloth but cheaper even than Britain's 
typical 20-count cotton yarn (51s 8d per pound) and prompted the Board to issue a warning to the low-wage 
countries conducting this sales offensive.34 In point of production cost, by about 1955 Hong Kong had 
become Japan's closest competitor. However, in the local Hong Kong market and in Southeast Asia 
competition from Japan and China was severe, and a considerable portion of exports went in the direction of 
Britain, taking advantage of preferential tariffs.35 
 
What progress was made in import substitution in developing countries? Here let us examine briefly two 
cases, Pakistan and Indonesia. Taking Pakistan first (see Table 9), at independence in 1947 there was hardly 
any modern cotton industry, and the country was dependent initially on imports from India and then from 
                                 
27  Sengo Nihon no Boeki·Kinyu Kyotei, pp.49-60. "Indonesia and the European Recovery Program", 
Indonesia Information, 4-2, April-June 1950, pp.71-72. 
28 Cotton Board Trade Letter, No.71, January 1951, p.4. QSR, No.15, July 1949, p.1. 
29 QSR, No.21, March 1951, pp.1-2. Ibid., No.29, March 1953, p.2. 
30  "Australia's Import Cuts", Textile Recorder, April 1952, p.75. "Export Development: Possibilities of the 
East and West African Markets", Textile Recorder, April 1953, p.63. QSR, No.38, June 1955, p.1. 
31 For example, 64 per cent of Japanese cotton textiles exports went to the sterling area in 1952. Abe, 
Keikogyo no Saiken, p.592. 
32 Singleton, Lancashire on the Scrapheap , p.119. MacDougall and Hutt, "Imperial Preference", pp.251-56. 
Cotton Board Trade Letter, No.82, November 1952, pp.1-2. 
33 QSR, No.26, June 1952, p.2. Ibid., No.29, March 1953, p.2. Ibid., No.32, December 1953, p.2. 
34 Cotton Board, The Cotton Industry and the Consequence of Unlimited Imports, Manchester, 1956, 
pp.10-12. The price of imported goods at that point was 43 shillings 3 pence for Chinese cloth, and 50 
shillings 5 pence for Hong Kong cloth. 
35 Ajia no Sen-i Sangyo, pp.280-82, 286-87. HTA, 1955, p.57. Ibid., 1956, p.15. Ibid., 1961, p.47. 
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Japan, but a spinning industry using the country's own raw cotton suddenly sprang up, achieving a very rapid 
growth in which the number of spindles more than quadrupled between 1948 and 1953. In 1952, in response 
to the demand of spinning companies, the government raised the import duty on British cloth from 24 to 54 
per cent, and on other countries' from 30 to 60 per cent, a typical example of infant industry protection. This 
and a shortage of foreign exchange combined to raise the domestic price temporarily, but production 
expanded steadily thereafter and from about 1953 imports started to fall markedly. In 1957 exports exceeded 
imports for the first time, and in 1960 Pakistan disappeared from the Cotton Board's list of principal 
importing countries. This could be called a successful example of rapid import substitution.36 In addition, 
Pakistan advanced actively into the international cotton yarn market from which the principal exporters of 
textiles such as Japan had more or less disappeared. At the beginning of the 1950s Pakistan was importing 
considerable amounts of cotton yarn from Hong Kong, but by 1955 she had transformed herself into an 
exporter and by 1956 was so successful as to threaten Hong Kong yarn in its home market.37 
 
Indonesia's import substitution industrialization policy was initiated in earnest at about the time a cease-fire 
was agreed between the Netherlands and the Indonesian government in December 1949. However, the 
latter's policy had great limitations in a number of respects. At this period there was roaring inflation and the 
falling exchange rate tended to be unable to keep up with the resulting price rises, and therefore the actual 
price of imports declined and made foreign cloth competitive. The interests of merchants, especially those of 
import traders bent on achieving their own ends, probably also played a part. In addition, the setting of the 
tariff wall was arbitrary and lacked consistency. For example, the domestic cotton yarn production was as 
yet insufficient to satisfy demand, but imports of cotton yarn were not allowed to increase even though the 
plant capacity utilization rate in the cotton piece goods industry was low. Meanwhile in the spinning 
industry the rate of capacity utilization tended to fall because of difficulties in importing raw cotton. In these 
conditions, import substitution took considerably longer in Indonesia than in Pakistan, and throughout the 
years 1950-56 the quantity of cotton piece goods imports continued to exceed domestic production.38 In 
1952-53 imports from Hong Kong increased but from around the time in 1954 when restrictions were 
temporarily placed on imports due to a lack of foreign exchange, Japanese cloth became the main imports.39 
 
To sum up, in this period there was considerable variation in the import substitution industrialization of 
developing countries. The intensity of inter-Asian competition in the world market also remained uneven. 
 
The third period 
The most conspicuous characteristics of the second half of the 1950s were the appearance of a new tide of 
protectionism in the advanced countries, which wanted to keep imports from Asian countries within limits, 
and an intensification of inter-Asian competition in other markets. The protectionist trend of the West was 
already evident in continental Western Europe, but it was Britain and America that, while avoiding as far as 
possible any measures which would conflict with the framework of the GATT, established a pattern of 
introducing quotas through agreements reached in bilateral negotiations with individual countries. These 
agreements became the precursors to a series of international fibre agreements in the 1960s and later.40 In 
Britain from 1955-56 there was a campaign which attempted to restrict imports of Asian goods. Britain had 
imposed restrictions on imports from Japan in 1952-53, and imposed quotas on China in 1957, but now 
demanded quotas of Commonwealth countries such as India, Pakistan and Hong Kong. A reduction in tariffs 
on British goods entering India was obtained, and in negotiations spanning 1958-59 agreement was reached 
on import quotas for India, Pakistan and Hong Kong. Import restrictions were also an essential precondition 
                                 
36 "Foreign Trade and Textile Industry", in Fifteen Years of Textile Industry in Pakistan, Commercial Press 
of Pakistan, Karachi, 1965?, pp.163-75. Fakhruddin Valibhai, "Textile Industry in Pakistan,", HTA, 1956, 
pp.29-31. 
37 HTA, 1961, p.30. 
38 Palmer, Textiles in Indonesia, pp.57-60, 116-18. Ingrid Palmer and Lance Castles, "Textiles", in Bruce 
Glassburger ed., The Economy of Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1971, pp.322-25, 331-33. 
39 HTA, 1955, p.58. Ibid., 1961, p.43. Palmer, Textiles in Indonesia, p.201.  
40 Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism, Chapter 4. Aggarwal calls this trend liberal protectionism, and offers a 
narrative of the emergence of protectionism within the framework of the GATT from the international 
relations perspective. 
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of the  rationalization of the domestic cotton industry envisaged in the Cotton Industry Act of 1959.41 
However, as the level of import quota was raised in negotiations, the influx of cotton cloth made in India,  
Pakistan and Hong Kong continued and took approximately  10 per cent of the British market. In 1958 
imports from India exceeded exports to that country, reversing the trend of the previous hundred and fifty 
years.42 Meanwhile, in the American market there had already been demands from the cotton industry for 
restrictions on imports of Japanese cotton cloth in the first half of the 1950s. Japan's voluntary restraint of 
1955 and the intergovernmentally agreed quotas of 1957 were the response to this. However, although as a 
result Japan's share fell from 72 per cent in 1957 to 20 per cent in 1960, little was achieved since other Asian 
countries made great inroads in the American market, with Hong Kong taking 18 per cent, India 11 per cent, 
and Pakistan 3 per cent, to mention only the most important countries.43  In this way inter-Asian 
competition spread across the markets in advanced Western countries. 
 
Mirroring these trends in the advanced countries' markets, inter-Asian competition intensified in the other 
main markets too. In Ceylon, Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria, Japan stole India's share of the 
market, and in Australia and New Zealand, Britain's share. While in the Sudan India was dominant, and in 
Ghana Japan, in Malaya there was a three-cornered fight between Japan, India and China, with Japan the 
dominant contestant. In Thailand China came out ahead of Japan, Hong Kong and India, and in Hong Kong 
outdid Japan in market share.44 Japan and India also penetrated the Canadian market where America had 
been dominant. In addition, Japan and China began to take an interest in the Dutch market. Thus at the end 
of the 1950s the competition became truly global, and the British Commonwealth market ceased to have 
much real importance as a distinct unit in terms of tariffs or currency. 
 
In Indonesia, as a result of the quantitative restrictions of 1954 and the tariff increases of 1955, the domestic 
production of cotton piece goods overtook imports in 1956. Thereafter import substitution progressed so 
rapidly that in 1960 domestic production was 2.6 times as great as imports.45 One thing that had an 
influence in maintaining Japan's share in imports was the conclusion of an agreement that, as a part of 
American economic aid to Indonesia, Japan would import American raw cotton, make cotton cloth and then 
export it to Indonesia. In 1956 cotton yarn and cotton cloth, and in 1959 and 1960 (at Indonesia's request) 
only cotton yarn, were imported from Japan under this agreement.46 The other chief competitor in the 
Indonesian market was China, which in 1954 and 1956 concluded payment and trade agreements with 
Indonesia. As a result of these and the Chinese government's Southeast Asian diplomatic offensive, imports 
of Chinese goods also expanded sharply.47 In this period, China and Japan were dominant in unbleached 
and bleached cotton cloth respectively. That is not to say, however, that there was a definitive division in 
degree of processing or in product quality: the fact that the main source of imports of coloured cotton fabrics 
shifted from Japan to China is evidence to the contrary.48 Rather, generally speaking, the goods of both 
countries of the same quality came into the market at similar prices by the same sales routes in Southeast 
Asia. Hong Kong tended to be forced to retreat under the intense price competition from Japan and China.49  
 
Lastly let us look at Hong Kong's role in this period and how it changed, starting with its development as a 
base for entrepot and processing in cotton textiles. In 1954 Hong Kong was producing about 200 million 
square yards of cotton piece goods, of which 160 million were being exported. At the same time 110 million 
square yards were imported from Japan, India, Britain and China, and 20 million were re-exported to 
Indonesia and Thailand (see Table 6). However, part of what was counted as Hong Kong-made export cotton 
                                 
41 For details of the process of negotiation, see "U.K. Quota and U.S. Problems", HTA, 1961, pp.77-95, and 
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48 Statistical Pocket Book of Indonesia, passim. 
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piece goods was imported cotton piece goods which had been processed by dyers in Hong Kong, so that 
even at this date the entrepot-cum-processing base character of the colony was fairly strong.50 In 1956-58 
imports from Japan and China increased suddenly. The majority were re -exported, although an increase in 
demand from the dyeing and apparel sectors was also important. However, as soon as re-exports increased, 
direct exports from Japan and China to the country of final consumption increased the following year. When 
we come to 1959 re-exports suddenly dropped, and the great majority of exports from Japan and China 
underwent secondary processing such as machine-sewing in Hong Kong before being exported elsewhere. 
Hong Kong's apparel sector introduced Western and Japanese technology and capital from around 1953 and 
achieved rapid growth: by 1958 the value of exports of secondary processed cotton goods was already so 
great as to surpass that of cotton piece goods. The material used was mainly Japanese cotton piece goods, 
and by entering the America market where there was a gap created by Japan's voluntary restrictions, the 
apparel industry orientation of Hong Kong's cotton industry made great strides. From 1959 on Hong Kong's 
exports of cotton goods were about the same value as Japan's, and by advancing into Britain, West Germany 
etc. Hong Kong, together with Japan, initiated Asia's shift towards higher quailty cotton goods exports.51 
 
The strategic role fulfilled by Hong Kong did not stop there. In the above-mentioned negotiations with the 
advanced countries too, Hong Kong had a position which was extremely important for other Asian countries. 
First, in negotiations with Britain, Hong Kong took a stronger stance than India and Pakistan, and as a result 
got an advantageous import quota for the three countries. In the negotiations with America, Hong Kong 
displayed a more uncompromising stance than Japan, which was in a weak position vis -a-vis America.52 
The colony of course took advantage of Britain 's international standing, but it is undeniable that what 
strengthened its position more than anything else was the fact that as a free port it was putting the principles 
of the GATT into practice more fully than the advanced countries.  
 
To summarize, the postwar world market was initially divided into two, the British Commonwealth market 
and the non-Commonwealth free market. However in the Commonwealth market, with the retreat of the 
British cotton industry, supply was unable to keep up with the increased demand stemming from the rise in 
purchasing power due to the recovery in exports of primary products, while in Asian countries, particularly 
in Southeast Asia, the development of import substitution reduced imports from Japan, China and Hong 
Kong. Thus in the 1950s, with the entry of both Japan and China into the Commonwealth market, 
inter-Asian competition became global, and the Commonwealth market gradually became part of a 
competitive world market. If the idea behind preferential tariffs was a division of labour with Britain as the 
industrial  country and the rest as primary producers, one could say that the revised cotton piece goods 
world market changed it into one which assumed an international division of labour in which Asia 
specialised in cotton and other labour-intensive industries, and other countries were suppliers of heavy and 
chemical industry goods and primary products. 
 
4  The Impact of Asia's Industrialization 
 
Finally, I would like to develop the points presented above into a more general argument. First, the revival of 
inter-Asian competition did not necessarily mean a smooth industrialization of India and China, but it may 
be considered that the strong competitive pressure from these two countries was a decisive international 
factor which pushed the Japanese cotton industry towards an increase in productivity and diversification, 
including a shift to man-made fibres. Indian cotton piece goods replaced British cloth in the Commonwealth 
market and initially competed with Japanese cloth. As inter-Asian competition in the Commonwealth market 
intensified, gradually India specialized in those markets, notably Britain, where it was easy to gain entry, and 
maintained her position as the world's second largest exporter throughout the 1950s. However, India 
possessed a huge domestic market in which low-quality fabric was dominant and Indian industrial policy put 
priority on supplying this market with cheap cotton piece goods, with the result that product diversification 
and improvements in productivity were limited. China, except for a short period immediately after the 
Communist takeover, was also a powerful competitor for Japan in the world cotton piece goods market.  It 
cannot be denied that post-revolution China, handicapped by relatively expensive Chinese raw cotton and a 
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lack of updated machinery and equipment, gradually lost her international competitiveness and competed 
with Japan by artificially lowering prices. However, the fact that intense competition between Japan and 
China developed in Asia and Africa under the Cold War regime should be borne in mind. To put it another 
way, although Japan did not have any country yet to follow her, as the theory of the flying geese pattern of 
development hypothesises, at this period she was actually under strong competitive pressure from India and 
China of the kind that the theory assumes.53 Japan's originally labour-intensive cotton industry survived in 
competition with Asian and African countries in their relatively low-income markets by introducing wave 
after wave of labour-saving machinery. This was a strategy frequently employed by Japanese industry in 
fields where no rapid development of the market for higher quality products could be expected. And, it may 
be considered that this strategy was later followed by Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea etc and became the driving 
force behind the later flying geese pattern of development. 
 
Second, inter-Asian competition also had a great influence on Japanese industrial policy. Discussion of 
industrial policy has tended to focus on the "catching-up" aspect of leading sectors. However, the question of 
whether to protect, abandon or in some way restructure an industry once it has started to face competition 
from developing countries is now becoming one of the most important points of debate in industrial policy. 
The restructuring of the 1970s and 1980s has been praised and there is a school of thought that considers this 
to be the aspect of Japanese industrial policy most worthy of imitation by other countries.54 But it deserves 
pointing out that this policy was in fact being practised throughout the postwar period. That is to say, the 
Japanese cotton industry and government after the war did not adopt a defensive attitude towards inter-Asian 
competition, and very rapidly worked out that the solution was to raise productivity and to convert to 
man-made fibres. The view taken was that the industrialization of Asia was something inevitable, and the 
strategy conceived to meet the challenge was to make the old key industries labour-saving and 
technology-intensive and carry out a thorough remodelling of the industrial structure through a shift to 
higher-value added goods, an approach diametrically opposed to that of Western countries, which tended 
towards protectionism. The realistic recognition that if they continued as they were, sooner or later the 
labour-intensive industries would be faced with competition from lower-wage countries and lose the battle 
was something that was already clear given the background of competition with India and China. Certainly 
Japan was the  country where the idea of upgrading the industrial structure was put into practice most 
systematically, and this was a way of thinking which for a long time was hard for neoclassical economics to 
accommodate. However, it was not an expression applying only to the special circumstance Japan was in.  
It should be seen rather as a concept which tried to grasp a positive response any high-wage country should 
consider when she faced a competition from low-wage countries within the framework of a free trade system 
such as the GATT. 
 
Thirdly, behind the revival of inter-Asian comp etition, there was the fact that many Asian countries 
responded to the new free trade system championed by America by proceeding with industrialization. It was 
not only Japan, India, China and Hong Kong that did this. Most of the countries of Southeast Asia obtained 
foreign currency as a result of the recovery of exports of primary products to the West, and with this as 
capital set out to promote import substitution industrialization. In the process, when supply failed to keep up 
with demand there was an influx of cotton piece goods from the four main exporting countries, but as soon 
as domestic supply capacity caught up, imports were reduced. In this sense, the inter-Asian competition 
described in this paper was nothing but a surface adjustment process of demand and supply for Asia's 
industrialization. Naturally, from the exporting countries' point of view, this could only mean shrinking 
markets. Thus, with the progress of industrialization in the Asian countries, advanced cotton industries 
gradually ventured out into the world market.  The country which led the world market as a whole was of 
course America, but trade between Asian countries and America remained small.55 If Asia was to increase 
trade with the advanced countries, it had to capture the worldwide increase in demand accompanying the 
revival of Britain and other West European countries (a revival which was indirectly dependent on American 
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aid), and the recovery in purchasing power of the peripheral countries of Oceania etc. Hong Kong, as a 
entrepot and processing base, created a competitive market structure in Asia, and became the axis which 
gradually linked it to the world market. The commercial and financial networks and transport and 
communication networks to support trade were established. The whole of this linkage gradually changed the 
manner of involvement of the Asian economy in the world market into a more active one. The most 
important international factor which determined the pattern of export of Japanese cotton piece goods may be 
considered to have been this kind of structural change in the world market against the background of the 
industrialization of Asia.  
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Table 1  Geographical Composition World Exports of Cotton Cloth, 1937-1960   
(base unit: million square yards) 
 
 1937 1946 1948 1951 1954 1957 1960 
 
Japan 2,643 1 408 1,092 1,278 1,468 1,424 
India (a) 221 318 308 776 861 881 724 
China 50 3 260 3 15 299 562 
Hong Kong -- -- -- -- 163 196 312 
Taiwan (b) -- -- -- -- 1 20 98 
Pakistan (a) -- -- -- -- -- 10 76 
South Korea (b) -- -- -- -- -- -- 39 
Asia Total (c) 2948 344 1,016 1,871 2,336 2,894 3,254 
Continental Western  
Europe (b) 1,613 450 1,029 1,871 1,570 1,378 2,033 
Eastern Europe 
(incl Soviet Union) (c)308 6 155 254 359 594 743 
U.S.A. 227 789 940 781 591 548 437 
U.K. 1,921 514 761 864 637 456 327 
World Total (c) 7,159 2,416 4,144 6,220 5,670 6,205 7,147 
 
Source: Sengo Bosekishi, Appendix Table B-5.  
 
Notes: Figures for Hong Kong do not include re-exports (these re-exports are however included in Asia and 
world totals). Asia and world totals include countries other than those in this table. (a) indicates that figures 
are recorded in million yards; (b) in thousand quintals. (c) were calculated simply as the sum of all figures in 
different units. For details, see the main text and footnote 9. Figures in this table have been compiled not only 
from the Cotton Board, Quarterly Statistical Review, but from trade statistics of various countries and do not 
necessarily agree with those in the tables below.  
 
 
 
Table 2  Geographical Composition of World Imports of Cotton Cloth, 1937-1960 
 (base unit: million square yards) 
 
 1937 1951 1954 1957 1960 
 
U.K. 50 377 267 416 728 
U.S.A. 147 48 74 127 464 
West Germany (b) 50 31 78 154 287 
Hong Kong 107 97 106 281 321 
Indonesia (a) 779 587 506 505 295 
Burma (a) 170 91 128 163 170 
Malaya 142 345 134 169 168 
Thailand (b) 145 100 178 144 151 
Former French Indochina (b) 76 129 126 148 80 
The Philippines (b) 120 307 223 223 50 
South Africa (a) 220 306 252 234 222 
Nigeria  164 121 172 149 211 
Australia  171 326 304 275 355 
World Total (c) 6,405 6,080 5,368 5,884 6,594 
 
Source: Sengo Bosekishi, Appendix Table B-7.  
 
Note: See Table 1. 
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Table 3  Geographical Composition of Japanese Exports of Cotton Cloth, 1946-1960  
(in million square yards) 
 
 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
 
U.K. - 64 67 172 111 84 64 33 66 51 36 51 39 44 57 
U.S.A. - 7 9 3 22 2 6 33 49 140 123 82 97 97 87 
Australia  - 12 - 10 10 48 10 22 58 71 48 86 107 120 146 
Hong Kong - 3 - 12 30 49 57 48 54 61 138 151 111 124 112 
Pakistan n.a. n.a. n.a. 49 225 254 180 - 85 32 - - - - - 
Indonesia - 116 229 91 198 234 126 304 283 108 139 96 46 42 80 
Burma  - 9 1 - 39 7 10 41 68 43 47 52 10 52 57 
Malaya - 7 22 48 23 55 35 36 53 80 86 80 63 57 70 
The Philippines - 7 4 11 10 5 4 21 25 23 60 104 71 45 27 
Former French 
 Indochina - - - - - - - 1 - 22 72 81 52 52 53 
Ceylon - 6 1 15 17 14 17 21 26 35 55 48 73 39 43 
Thailand - 25 12 48 83 49 41 83 109 97 79 91 96 118 104 
British West Africa - 6 19 51 32 36 41 29 61 58 42 47 57 64 123 
World Total  1 399 448 744 1,087 1,082 752 914 1,278 1,139 1,262 1,46 1,245 1,263 1,425 
 
Source: Cotton Board, Quarterly Statistical Review, passim.  
 
Notes: There are marginal differences between the above figures and original Japanese statistics for the 
period from 1947 to 1952. The table includes those countries or regions whose annual volume of exports 
exceeded 50 million square yards during ths period. "-" refers to no exports or less than 0.5 million square 
yards. The total includes exports to countries other than those listed.  
 
 
 
Table 4  Geographical Composition of India's Exports of Cotton Cloth, 1946-1960 
 (in million yards) 
 
 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
 
Australia  32 24 20 34 45 38 9 31 45 42 41 50 47 49 49 
U.K. - - - 2 47 89 6 20 112 86 92 151 102 167 199 
Singapore - - - 37 205 171 88 50 34 29 34 28 22 29 23 
Burma  - n.a. n.a. 15 133 28 70 78 38 11 17 40 5 38 22 
Iran 16 12 6 31 88 61 62 78 69 48 41 42 37 38 31 
Ceylon 24 28 28 37 64 40 43 44 47 42 46 29 31 25 24 
Pakistan n.a. n.a. 142 38 50 4 56 1 26 6 3 2 - - - 
British East 
Africa 33 31 32 63 56 23 52 53 73 64 66 71 53 65 49 
British West  
Africa 20 n.a. n.a. 26 28 20 20 60 73 72 68 76 58 27 32 
Indonesia n.a. - - - - - - 32 31 n.a. 45 51 13 10 9 
Sudan 22 16 9 37 54 29 54 44 83 65 87 97 55 152 64 
World Total  318 236 308 466 1,109 776 597 655 861 749 747 881 622 850 724 
 
Source: Cotton Board, Quarterly Statistical Review, passim.  
 
Notes: See Table 3.  
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Table 5  Imports of Cotton Cloth from China, 1946-1960  
(base unit: million square yards) 
 
 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
 
U.K. - - - - - - - - - 5 9 28 39 28 25 
U.K. (a) - - - - -- - - - - 4 8 15 14 24 23 
The Netherlands (b) - - - - - - - - - - 1 6 26 52 43 
Australia  - - 12 1 - - - - - - 3 8 12 15 10 
Hong Kong 2 40 55 34 20 - - 2 8 62 101 100 127 126 156 
Malaya 13 70 45 15 9 2 - - 2 11 16 23 37 32 24 
Pakistan (c) n.a. n.a. 20 18 9 1 - 5 2 - - - - - - 
Iraq n.a. n.a. 12 5 - - - - - - - - - 6 7 
Nigeria  - - - - - - - - - - 4 6 22 19 16 
Sudan (b) - - - - - - - - - - 2 6 13 6 6 
Indonesia (c) - 16 14 26 5 - - - 4 38 114 114 86 66 120 
Ghana - - - - - - - - - - - 5 3 8 11 
World Total (d) 16 129 168 102 43 4 1 7 17 121 258 312 388 406 462 
 (3) (92) (260) - - (3) (1) (2) (15) (115) (245) (299) (361) (556) (562) 
 
Source: Cotton Board, Quarterly Statistical Review, passim.  
 
Notes: This table includes those countries or regions whose anual volume of imports exceeded 10 million 
square yards. Figures in brachets are from Sengo Bosekishi Appendix Table B-5. (a) refers to the portion 
re-exported from the U.K. after processing. (b) indicates one thousand quintals; (c) million yards; (d) total of 
figures in three different units. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6  Hong Kong's Trade of Cotton Cloth, 1946-1960  
(million square yards) 
 
 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
 
(imports)  
U.K. 1 8 6 6 6 5 3 6 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 
Japan - - 1 7 25 43 62 49 61 55 145 151 118 123 120 
China 2 41 55 34 20 - - 2 8 62 101 100 127 126 156 
Total 7 59 79 76 114 97 91 101 106 138 274 281 257 281 321 
(exports)  
U.K. - - - - - - 1 2 23 54 59 76 123 128 125 
U.S.A. - - - - - - - - - - - 3 4 41 86 
Indonesia - 11 8 1 11 26 98 96 74 27 24 29 6 3 14 
Total 22 87 132 111 142 160 165 134 163 165 141 196 220 235 312 
(re-exports)  
Thailand n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 12 1 9 52 18 28 7 5 
Indonesia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 22 9 29 102 105 100 21 72 
Total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 47 20 59 182 148 147 46 92 
 
Source: Cotton Board, Quarterly Statistical Review, passim.  
 
Note: This table includes those countries whose annual volume of trade exceeded 50 million square yards, 
except for imports from the U.K.
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Table 7  Geographical Composition of U.K. Imports of Cotton Cloth, 1948-1960 
 (million square yards) 
 
 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
 
Japan 55 178 91 85 71 38 52 64 32 57 42 44 52 
China - - - - - - - 5 9 28 39 28 25 
Hong Kong - - - - - 2 20 51 58 75 119 137 123 
India - 3 76 109 11 16 133 137 133 186 128 193 231 
Spain 5 7 21 27 7 2 - - 3 2 1 10 64 
Pakistan - - - - - - - - 8 7 2 32 40 
Total 226 348 287 377 180 99 267 300 306 416 387 537 728 
(a)  
Japan 54 165 89 82 54 38 52 64 31 57 40 43 50 
China - - - - - - - 4 8 15 14 24 23 
Total (Exports) 761 904 822 864 711 709 637 555 474 456 384 347 327 
 
Source: Cotton Board, Quarterly Statistical Review, passim.  
 
Notes: This table includes those countries whose annual volume of imports exceeded 40 million square yards, 
except for Germany who imp orted 62 million yards in 1948 and 47 million square yards in 1949. Figures 
after (a) represent the portion of imports from Japan and China to be re-exported from the U.K. after 
processing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8  Geographical Composition of Indonesia's imports of Cotton Cloth, 1948-1960 
 (in million yards) 
 
 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
 
U.S.A. 13 51 58 106 64 87 25 46 13 3 1 - 2 
Singapore 3 4 25 37 4 - - - - - - - - 
Hong Kong 3 2 11 24 106 119 86 66 78 104 82 24 57 
U.K. 7 13 9 14 10 15 4 7 4 2 - - - 
Japan 243 156 191 287 182 294 300 123 186 173 79 44 57 
India 1 4 62 54 29 49 42 89 54 63 18 18 9 
Hungary - - - - - 6 8 17 11 - - - 2 
The Netherlands 38 59 48 51 36 43 27 38 42 31 12 9 6 
China 9 26 5 1 1 - 4 38 114 114 86 66 120 
World Total  340 340 412 587 436 626 506 451 532 505 287 171 295 
 
Source: Cotton Board, Quarterly Statistical Review, passim.  
 
Note: This table includes those countries whose annual volume of imports exceeded 15 million square yards. 
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Table 9  Geographical Composition of Pakistan's imports of Cotton Cloth, 1948-1960 
 (in million yards) 
 
 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
 
India 156 53 74 26 51 4 10 5 - - - - - 
China 20 18 9 1 - - - - - - - - - 
U.K. 29 69 66 40 34 3 1 5 5 1 - - - 
Italy 2 6 9 4 1 - - - - - - - - 
Japan 7 106 200 262 138 8 28 19 33 1 1 2 - 
Hong Kong 2 2 2 - - - - - - - - - - 
Total 240 286 409 392 242 16 41 30 45 3 1 2 - 
Exports   - - - - - - - - 17 10 4 42 76 
 
 
Source: Cotton Board, Quarterly Statistical Review, passim.  
 
Note: Imports from some countries or regions are not listed in the above table. 
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